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Abstract
We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A ﬁnite
number of ﬁrms decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon
investment, a ﬁrm receives ﬂow proﬁts which decrease in the number of ﬁrms that have
invested. The cost of investment declines over time exogenously. We characterize the
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome, which is unique up to a permutation of players.
When the preemption race among late investors is suﬃciently intense, the preemption
incentive for earlier investors disappears, and two or more investments occur at the
same time. We identify a suﬃcient condition in terms of model parameters: clustering
of investments occurs if the ﬂow proﬁts from consecutive investments are suﬃciently
close. This shows how clustering can occur in the absence of coordination failures,
informational spillovers or positive payoﬀ externalities.
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Consider a game of timing in which players have to decide when to make an investment. The
cost of investing declines over time. A ﬁrm earns a positive proﬁt ﬂow upon investment,
but proﬁt ﬂows decline in the number of investors. This is a preemption game: Delay
exogenously increases payoﬀs through lower investment cost, but each player also has an
incentive to invest early, because there is an early mover advantage.
In a preemption game, investment by a player reduces the post-investment ﬂow proﬁt
for later investors, and hence the incentive of the remaining players to invest. Therefore, our
intuition lets us expect a period of delay until the next investment occurs. This intuition
is correct for the case of two players (Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)) but, as we show in this
paper, may fail otherwise.
We study a general N-Player investment preemption game and identify a mechanism
that generates clustering of investment times: When the preemption race among late in-
vestors is very intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors is reduced. If this eﬀect
is suﬃciently strong, two or more investments occur at the same time. This happens when
the ﬂow proﬁts of subsequent investments are suﬃciently close.
The mechanism we identify is novel. Both the theoretical and the empirical literature
on timing games have focused on diﬀerent factors that can generate clustering of investment
times. The theoretical explanations for the presence of clusters include coordination failures,
as in Levin and Peck (2003), positive network externalities, as in Mason and Weeds (2010),
and informational spillovers (e.g. Chamley and Gale (1994)), where rival investment signals
a high proﬁtability of investment. Brunnermeier and Morgan (2010) show that “herding”
occurs in a preemptive “clock game”, but attribute this herding eﬀect to private information
being (partially) revealed by the ﬁrst player to act. In our model, clusters are due purely
to preemption and backward induction. Coordination failures are ruled out by assumption,
rival investment has no informational content, no positive externalities, and lowers the
post-investment ﬂow proﬁt for later investors.
Our analysis therefore provides an alternative interpretation of the empirical evidence.
A large body of empirical literature has examined how rival adoption or market entry
aﬀects the timing of a ﬁrm’s own technology adoption or market entry. Several papers have
found that adoption by a rival accelerates the adoption by remaining ﬁrms (clusters are the
1most extreme form of acceleration).1 This acceleration has been interpreted as evidence of
positive payoﬀ externalities or informational eﬀects, but we provide a simpler alternative
explanation based purely on preemption.
The mechanism through which clusters arise in our model is the following. Suppose
there are three ﬁrms: if being the second investor is proﬁtable relative to being the third,
the preemption race to be the second investor is intense, and in equilibrium the second
investment occurs early. In order to obtain monopoly proﬁts for some time, a ﬁrm would
have to invest even earlier. If monopoly proﬁts are not much higher than duopoly proﬁts,
no ﬁrm wants to incur the extra-cost that is necessary to invest strictly before the second
investor, and the ﬁrst and second investments are clustered. In a game with more than three
players, a similar mechanism can cause clusters of any size, at any point in the investment
sequence.
This simple mechanism, purely based on preemption, has useful implications for the
inference that can be drawn about ﬁrms proﬁts, when the timing of investments and the
pattern of clustering are observed for a given market. Our result implies that if investment
times are generated by a preemption game and clustering is observed, a bound on the decline
in proﬁts due to rival investment can be calculated.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Immediately below we dicuss the
related literature. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3.1 illustrates the benchmark
case of a two-player game, in which investments are never clustered in equilibrium. Section
3.2 describes the mechanism that generates clustering, in the context of the three-player
game. Section 3.3 characterizes the unique equilibrium outcome of the N-player game.
Section 3.4 derives a suﬃcient condition on the primitives of the model for the presence of
a cluster of two or more investments. Section 4 concludes.
1These papers ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s adoption hazard increases when a rival adopts. Karshenas and Stoneman
(1993, p.521) interpret this acceleration of adoption as “epidemic eﬀects” in the adoption of numerically
controlled machine tools. Hannan and McDowell (1987, p.186) speak of “spillover eﬀects” in the context of
ATM adoption by banks, and Levin, Levin and Meisel (1992, p.347) argue that there is an informational
eﬀect via customers in the case of optical scanners in grocery stores.
2Identifying clusters empirically may be diﬃcult because data often come in yearly intervals as it is the
case in the empirical literature mentioned above. Increasing access to administrative data sources alleviates
this problem. For example Kaniovski and Peneder (2008) use social security data to identify the date of hire
of the ﬁrst employee as the day of entry of a ﬁrm.
2Related literature
Seminal papers by Reinganum (1981a) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) study technology
adoption games of unobservable and observable actions with two players respectively. Rein-
ganum (1981b) derives the equilibrium of a game of technology adoption with N ﬁrms and
unobservable actions. Anderson and Engers (1994) study a modiﬁed game where there is a
time window in which players decide to act and payoﬀs of a static game played only among
those who have acted are collected after expiration of this time window. In two related
papers, Park and Smith (2008, 2010) analyze a timing game with a general payoﬀ structure
and more than two players. See Park and Smith (2008) for the case of unobservable actions,
and Park and Smith (2010) for the case of observable actions and a continuum of players.
Goetz (1999) discusses the case of a continuum of ﬁrms where the preemption motive is
absent.
Hoppe (2002) surveys the extensive literature on technology preemption games, changing
the assumptions on the information structure or the payoﬀ structure. Hoppe and Lehmann-
Grube (2005) study a version of a two-player game with a general deterministic payoﬀ
structure. More recently, Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011) consider a game with privately
observed payoﬀs. Bobtcheﬀ and Mariotti (2011) study a game with uncertainty regarding
the presence of a competitor.
We rely on the equilibrium property of rent equalization to characterize conditions for
clustering. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show that in the technology adoption game with
observable actions and two players rent equalization must hold. They also illustrate why
it may not hold with more than two players. The case of two players is also studied in
Gilbert and Harris (1984) when analyzing a game where ﬁrms engage in lumpy capacity
investments. While positive proﬁts are earned with unobservable actions, they show that
there exists a class of subgame perfect equilibria in the game with two players and observable
actions where rents are fully dissipated. They conjecture that their arguments extend to
the N-player game.
Mills (1988) shows that rent dissipation in a game of preemptive investment depends
crucially on the ability of ﬁrms to make costless credible threats. If credible threats are
costly, for example because investment must be made in temporarily separated steps, rents
are not dissipated and proﬁts almost as high as monopoly proﬁts can be achieved in equi-
librium. Mills (1991) analyzes a multiplayer model of lumpy capacity investment very close
3to ours. Arguing that rent equalization must hold in equilibrium, he discusses the welfare
implications of preemptive investment, and in particular the possibility that it leads to ex-
cessive and/or premature entry. Our paper contributes to this literature by establishing the
possibility of clusters of investments, investigating the mechanism behind them, and their
implications for the interpretation of industry data.
Strategic investment has also been studied in a real options framework. Greater uncer-
tainty over the proﬁtability of investment increases the option value of waiting and thus
the tendency to delay investment. For recent examples see Weeds (2002) and references
therein, as well as the survey by Hoppe (2002). In independent work, Bouis, Huisman and
Kort (2009) study dynamic investment in oligopoly in a real options framework and ﬁnd
comparative statics result that are closely related to ours.3 The real options approach al-
lows aggregate uncertainty in the payoﬀ process, but is restricted to a speciﬁc payoﬀ growth
process for payoﬀs (a Brownian motion with drift).
Bulow and Klemperer (1994) study a model with a seller who has multiple identical
objects and multiple buyers with independent private values. They show that if buyers’
valuations are not too diﬀerent, frenzies of simultaneous purchases can occur because a
purchase by a buyer increases the remaining buyers’ willingness to pay. In our model,
investment by a player lowers the ﬂow proﬁt achievable by the next investor. Nonetheless,
clusters are possible if this decrease is suﬃciently small, and the ensuing preemption race
to take the role of the next investor is suﬃciently intense.
2 Model
2.1 The investment game
We analyze an inﬁnite horizon dynamic game in continuous time. At time 0, a new invest-
ment opportunity becomes available, and N identical players (ﬁrms) have to decide if, and
when, to seize this opportunity. The investment opportunity can be interpreted as adoption
of a new technology, or entry into a new market. Investment is observable and irreversible.
The set of ﬁrms is denoted by N = {1,...,N} and a single ﬁrm is denoted by i ∈ N.
The model corresponds to the one studied by Reinganum (1981a, 1981b) and Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985) except for the following: Until a ﬁrm invests, it receives constant ﬂow
3Bouis et al. (2009) provide an explicit argument for existence of equilibrium, and for the existence of a
cluster for the case of N = 3. For the general N-player game they provide comparative statics results under
the assumption that equilibrium exists, and a numerical example.
4of proﬁts π0 which we normalize to zero. This assumption that pre-investment payoﬀs are
independent of the number of earlier investments will be essential for obtaining a unique
outcome in each subgame, which in turn guarantees rent equalization.4 Upon investment, a
ﬁrm earns ﬂow proﬁts of π(m), where m is the number of ﬁrms that have already invested
at a given point in time. Let π = (π(1),π(2),...,π(N)) denote a ﬂow proﬁt structure.
Let c(t) be the present value at time zero of the cost of investing at time t. If the
outcome of the game is that the vector of investment times is Tj, for j = 1,...N, and ﬁrm
i is the j-th investor, then ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ is the following:
V
j
i (T1,T2,...,Tj,...,TN) =
N ￿
m=j
π(m)
￿ Tm+1
Tm
e−rsds − c(Tj) (1)
where r denotes the common discount rate, and TN+1 ≡ +∞.
We introduce the following assumptions:
Assumption 1
Flow proﬁts π (m) are (i) strictly positive for any m and (ii) strictly decreasing in m.
Investing always increases period payoﬀs for a ﬁrm, but the beneﬁts of investing decrease
in the total number of investors: as more ﬁrms invest, competition among the investors
becomes more intense.
Assumption 2
The current value cost function
￿
c(t)ert￿
is (i) strictly decreasing and (ii) strictly convex.
The cost of investing declines over time. This may capture upstream process innovations
or economies of learning and scale. Moreover, cost declines at a decreasing rate.
Assumption 3
(i) At time zero, the investment cost exceeds discounted monopoly payoﬀs: c(0) >
π(1)
r .
(ii) Eventually, investment is proﬁtable for all players: ∃τ such that c(τ)erτ <
π(N)
r .
Assumption 3(i) guarantees that investing at time zero is too costly. No ﬁrm would
invest immediately, even if it could thereby preempt all other ﬁrms and enjoy monopoly
proﬁts π(1) forever. Assumption 3(ii) ensures that the value of investing becomes positive in
4However, the normalization of pre-investment payoﬀs to zero, rather than any positive constant, will
not aﬀect the results of the paper.
5ﬁnite time: The cost of investing eventually reaches a level suﬃciently low, that it becomes
proﬁtable to invest, even for a ﬁrm facing maximum competition.5
In what follows, we will denote by tj the j-th equilibrium investment time.6 If the j-th
and (j + 1)-th investments occur at the same instant in time, i.e. tj = tj+1, we say that
they are clustered.
2.2 Strategies in continuous-time preemption games
We model strategies in a timing game with observable actions and continuous time adopting
the framework introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989).7 Each player has two actions
available, “wait” and “invest.” Players can move at any time in [0,∞). A decision node is
a point in time paired with a complete description of past moves, and a pure strategy is
deﬁned as a function that assigns an action to each node. An outcome is a complete record
of the decisions made throughout the game.
In this framework, the question of how to associate an outcome to a continuous-time
strategy proﬁle is addressed in the following way. A continuous-time strategy here is inter-
preted as “a set of instructions about how to play the game on every conceivable discrete-
time grid”(Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), p. 1174). For any continuous-time strategy
proﬁle, a sequence of outcomes is generated by restricting play to an arbitrary sequence of
increasingly ﬁne discrete-time grids, and the limit of this sequence of outcomes is deﬁned
as the continuous-time outcome of the proﬁle. Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) identify con-
ditions for the existence and the uniqueness of this limit. The strategies we consider here
will satisfy these conditions.8
The Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) framework is deﬁned for pure strategies only.9 A
well-known problem with modeling preemption games in continuous time is that typically
games in this class do not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, due to the possibility of
5We will discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in Section 3.3.
6In Proposition 1 we prove that the vector of equilibrium investment times (t1,...,tN) is unique.
7Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005) ﬁrst showed how to adopt this framework to model a preemption
game.
8The conditions required are (F1) an upper bound on the number of moves, (F2) that strategies depend
piecewise continuously on time, and (F3) strong right continuity of the strategies with respect to histories.
Condition (F1) is naturally satisﬁed, because investment is a one-time irreversible decision. Condition (F2)
is an explicit restriction that we impose on the strategies. We satisfy condition (F3) by considering strategies
which depend only on how many ﬁrms have already invested but not on the time when they have invested.
9For N = 2 our model is a special case of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They develop an alternative
methodology for modeling games in continuous time, based on an extended deﬁnition of mixed strategies.
When applied to the two player case, their methodology generates the same equilibrium outcome. We
conjecture that this would be true also for the general N-player case.
6coordination failures. We explicitly rule out coordination failures introducing a randomiza-
tion device as in Katz and Shapiro (1987), Dutta, Lach and Rustichini (1995), and Hoppe
and Lehmann-Grube (2005):
Assumption 4
If n ﬁrms invest at the same instant t (with n = 2,3,.,N), then only one ﬁrm, each with
probability 1
n, succeeds.
The randomization device is introduced for the purpose of ruling out the possibility that
simultaneous investments occur as a consequence of a coordination failure. At the same
time, it allows for the presence of simultaneous investments as long as they are optimal for
the ﬁrms involved.
To illustrate how the randomization device works, consider the case N = 2. First,
suppose that at a given time t each ﬁrm would like to invest, provided that the rival does
not do so. Suppose that at time t both ﬁrms try to invest. Without the randomization
device, they would both be successful, i.e. they would both pay the cost c(t) and start
receiving ﬂow payoﬀs π(2). This would constitute a coordination failure: ex-post, each ﬁrm
would regret having invested. With the randomization device instead, if at time t both
ﬁrms try to invest, “the clock stops”. The game proceeds as follows with time standing
still. First, only one of the two ﬁrms (each with probability 1/2) successfully invests, i.e.
only one actually pays the cost c(t). Then, the remaining ﬁrm observes that its opponent
has invested. It has two options. It can try to invest “consecutively but at the same instant
of time,”10 that is after observing the ﬁrst investment, but at the same time t. Alternatively
it can let the clock restart and the game continue. Since the ﬁrm observes that its opponent
has invested at t, and investment at t was optimal only provided that the rival did not invest,
it selects the second option. Hence, at t only one ﬁrm invests and there is no coordination
failure.
Now suppose that at time t each ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to invest whether or not the rival
does so. If both ﬁrms try invest at t, the clock stops. Only one ﬁrm is successful. The
remaining ﬁrm has again the option to invest or let the clock restart. Now, however it will
choose to invest immediately because it is optimal to do so. Hence there will be a cluster
10See Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), p. 1177.
7of two investments, which does not constitute a coordination failure.11,12
2.3 The optimal “stand-alone” investment times
In this subsection we illustrate the basic trade-oﬀ of the investment problem, abstracting
from strategic considerations. Consider the hypothetical problem of a ﬁrm who acts as a
single decision maker and has to select the optimal time to make an investment which has
cost c(t) and guarantees ﬂow payoﬀ of π(j) forever, for j ∈ {1,...,N}, where c(t) and π (j)
satisfy assumptions 1 to 3. This ﬁrm would choose t to maximize the following proﬁt:
fj (t) ≡
π(j)
r
e−rt − c(t). (2)
We denote the solution to this problem as T∗
j . Adopting the terminology in Katz and
Shapiro (1987), we deﬁne it as the stand-alone investment time for π(j). Observe that
fj (t) is strictly quasi-concave and that T∗
j is well-deﬁned13 for every j ∈ 1,...,N as the
solution to
f￿
j (t) = 0 ⇐⇒ −π(j)e−rt − c￿ (t) = 0. (3)
At time T∗
j , the marginal beneﬁt from delaying investment, that is the cost reduction c￿ (t),
is exactly equal to the marginal cost, that is the foregone discounted proﬁt ﬂow π (j)e−rt.
Before T∗
j , a player is willing to delay because the cost is decreasing at a speed that more than
compensates the foregone proﬁt ﬂow. After T∗
j , a player would rather invest immediately
than delay. It follows from the implicit function theorem that T∗
j < T∗
j￿ for j < j￿: For a
larger foregone proﬁt ﬂow, that is for j < j￿, the stand-alone time is earlier.
3 Equilibrium analysis
We now return to the strategic environment, and solve for the equilibria of the game. A
feature of any equilibrium of the game that is built into our assumptions is the following:
11For an interpretation of this randomization device, we refer to Dutta, Lach and Rustichini (1995). An
alternative assumption is made in Dutta and Rustichini (1993): If two ﬁrms stop simultaneously, both
receive a convex combination of the payoﬀ from being the only one to stop at that time, and the payoﬀ from
stopping later, at the optimal time for a “follower”. This assumption introduces the possibility of clusters
of simultaneous investments through a mechanism that is unrelated to the one illustrated in our paper.
12An alternative formalization of continuous time strategies has been introduced recently by Murto and
Välimäki (2011). To be applied in this model, it also needs to be augmented with a randomization device
to avoid non-existence of equilibrium.
13For a proof, see Claim 1 in the Appendix.
8Lemma 1 In any pure-strategy SPNE, no ﬁrm invests at t = 0, all ﬁrms invest in ﬁnite
time, and the last investment takes place at the stand-alone investment time T∗
N.
Assumptions 1(ii) and 3(i) guarantee that investment at time zero is too costly.14 As-
sumptions 2(i) and 3(ii) guarantee that all ﬁrms invest in ﬁnite time. The result that
the last equilibrium investment time is exactly the stand-alone investment time T∗
N is not
surprising: when only one active ﬁrm is left, it maximizes the proﬁt (2) for j = N.
Next, we introduce our benchmark: the two-player investment game analyzed by Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1985).
3.1 The benchmark case: two ﬁrms, no clustering
Suppose N = 2. The easiest way to capture the intuition for this game is to use a backward
induction approach. By Lemma 1, both ﬁrms invest no later than the second stand-alone
investment time T∗
2. Therefore, each ﬁrm anticipates that if it invests ﬁrst at some time
t < T∗
2, the opponent will follow at T∗
2. The payoﬀ from this early investment will then be
what Fudenberg and Tirole deﬁne as the Leader Payoﬀ :
L(t) = π(1)
￿ T∗
2
t
e−rsds + π(2)
￿ ∞
T∗
2
e−rsds − c(t). (4)
Alternatively, a ﬁrm could wait until T∗
2 and receive the Follower Payoﬀ:
F (t) = π(2)
￿ ∞
T∗
2
e−rsds − c(T∗
2). (5)
The beneﬁt from being the leader, rather than the follower, is that high proﬁts π(1) are
earned for some period. The cost is that early investment is more expensive than late
investment. The fact that the cost of investment, although initially prohibitive, is decreasing
and convex, guarantees that the leader and follower payoﬀ curves have the shape illustrated
in Figure 1. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) prove that the ﬁrst time at which an investment
occurs in equilibrium, t1, is the earliest time when the two curves intersect. In equilibrium,
ﬁrms invest at diﬀerent points in time15 and payoﬀs are the same for both ﬁrms (there is
rent equalization).
14This fact is crucial in proving that all players receive the same payoﬀ in equilibrium. Relaxing assumption
3(i), one could generate an equilibrium in which some players invest at time zero and receive a higher payoﬀ
than the remaining players, who would instead invest later and receive all the same, lower payoﬀ.
15The assumption that pre-investment payoﬀs are constant rules out the possibility of what Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985) deﬁne as “late joint adoption equilibria”.
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Figure 1: No clustering in the two-player game. The LPC brings the ﬁrst investment forward
to t1. Earlier preemption is not proﬁtable: before t1, F(t) exceeds L(t). The ﬁgure is drawn for
cost function c(t) = 2 · 10
4e−(α+r)t for α = 0.24, r = 0.1, and ﬂow proﬁts π= (440,300).
The mechanism at work is the following: if unconstrained by strategic considerations,
a single ﬁrm would like to invest at the stand-alone time T∗
1. Also in the presence of an
opponent, each ﬁrm would like to invest ﬁrst, at T∗
1. The opponent would then follow at T∗
2.
The leader would receive a higher payoﬀ than the follower. This cannot be an equilibrium
because the ﬁrm who takes the role of the follower could proﬁtably deviate and preempt
the opponent by investing at T∗
1 −ε. The presence of a second player introduces a Leader
Preemption Constraint (LPC) on the time of the ﬁrst investment: Leader investment
cannot take place at a time when earlier preemption is proﬁtable. As a consequence, the
ﬁrst investment must occur strictly earlier than T∗
1. In particular, it must occur weakly
before the ﬁrst intersection of the Leader and Follower payoﬀ functions. Since the leader
payoﬀ function is increasing in that interval, the ﬁrst investment will occur at the latest
time that satisﬁes the LPC, i.e. the ﬁrst intersection of the two curves.
3.2 The three-ﬁrm game: When are the ﬁrst two investments clustered?
In this section, we move away from the two-player benchmark and illustrate the possibility
of clustering in a the context of a three-player game. As in the two-player game, the ﬁrst
investment must occur strictly earlier than T∗
1. The key diﬀerence from the two-player game
is that t1 is identiﬁed by the presence of two constraints. One is the LPC constraint discussed
above. The second is what we call the Follower Preemption Constraint (FPC). The
latter reﬂects the fact that the ﬁrst investment is followed by a preemption race among the
remaining two players. This race among followers determines an upper bound on the time
of the ﬁrst investment.
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we show that the ﬁrst and second investments
can be clustered or not clustered. Which case occurs depends on which of the two constraints
10on t1, the FPC or the LPC, is binding in equilibrium. Then, we examine how the model
primitives determine which constraint is binding. We proceed by solving the game by
backward induction. Figure 2 illustrates.
The two-ﬁrm subgame
Suppose that the ﬁrst investment has occurred, and consider the ensuing two-ﬁrm subgame.
It is analogous to the two-ﬁrm game of Section 3.1. By Lemma 1, all ﬁrms must invest by
T∗
3. Each ﬁrm anticipates that if it invests ﬁrst at some time t < T∗
3, the opponent will
follow at T∗
3. The Leader Payoﬀ and Follower Payoﬀ for this subgame are
L2 (t) = π(2)
￿ T∗
3
t
e−rsds + π(3)
￿ ∞
T∗
3
e−rsds − c(t) and (6)
F2 (t) = π(3)
￿ ∞
T∗
3
e−rsds − c(T∗
3) (7)
respectively. The threat of preemption guarantees that the ﬁrst investment in the subgame
must take place at the earliest time when L2 (t) = F2 (t). The second investment time in
the game, t2, coincides with this intersection. The last investment occurs at T∗
3.
The Follower Preemption Constraint (FPC)
The conclusion above that the second investment occurs at the earliest intersection of L2 (t)
and F2 (t) clearly assumes that the ﬁrst investment must occur weakly before this intersec-
tion. We show by contradiction that this must be the case in equilibrium. Suppose that the
ﬁrst investment took place strictly later, at some time τ ≤ T∗
3. A two-ﬁrm subgame would
then start at τ. Because L2 (τ) > F2 (τ), both ﬁrms would prefer to be leader rather than
follower in this subgame. They would both try to invest at τ, one would succeed and the
other would invest later at T∗
3. This cannot be an equilibrium because each of the last two
investors receives a lottery between L2 (τ) and F2 (τ) while it could deviate and guarantee
itself a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to L2 (τ). Deviating by investing at τ − ε, a ﬁrm would
be the ﬁrst investor in the game. It would trigger a two-ﬁrm subgame in which one more
investment would occur at τ − ε and the last one at T∗
3. Therefore, the deviator would
receive a payoﬀ of L2 (τ − ε).
We have established that the time of the ﬁrst investment t1 is constrained by the presence
of a preemption race in the ensuing two-ﬁrm subgame: to guarantee that there is rent
equalization in this race, t1 must be no later than the ﬁrst intersection of the leader and
follower payoﬀ curves of the two-ﬁrm subgame, namely L2 (t) and F2 (t). We call this the
11Follower Preemption Constraint (FPC). As the second investment time t2 coincides
with this intersection, we say that the FPC is binding in equilibrium if the ﬁrst investment
occurs exactly at t2, and not binding if it occurs strictly earlier than t2.16
The Leader Preemption Constraint (LPC)
We now illustrate the LPC for the three-player game. It follows from the analysis above
that the second and third investments will occur at t2, with L2 (t2) = F2 (t2), and t3 = T∗
3
respectively. The FPC requires that the ﬁrst investment occurs weakly earlier than the ﬁrst
intersection of L2 (t) and F2 (t). Therefore, the Leader payoﬀ in the three-player game, i.e.
the payoﬀ of the ﬁrst investor, is:
L1 (t) = π(1)
￿ t2
t
e−rsds + π(2)
￿ T∗
3
t2
e−rsds + π(3)
￿ ∞
T∗
3
e−rsds − c(t). (8)
The Follower payoﬀ in the three-ﬁrm game, i.e. the payoﬀ from being either the second or
the third investor, is
F1 (t) = π(2)
￿ T∗
3
t2
e−rsds + π(3)
￿ ∞
T∗
3
e−rsds − c(t2) = π(3)
￿ ∞
T∗
3
e−rsds − c(T∗
3). (9)
As in the two-player game, there is a LPC: the ﬁrst investment cannot occur at a time
such that earlier preemption is proﬁtable, because otherwise any of the followers would
have a proﬁtable deviation. We say that the LPC on t1 is binding in equilibrium if given
the subsequent investment times t2 and t3, L1 (t) > F1 (t) for some t < t2. Otherwise,
preempting the leader is never proﬁtable, and we say that the LPC is not binding.
The relationship between FPC and LPC
The FPC reﬂects the intensity of the follower preemption race that starts after the ﬁrst
investment: The more intense this race, the earlier is the ﬁrst intersection of L2 (t) and
F2 (t), i.e. the earlier is t2. The LPC instead reﬂects the intensity of the race to be the ﬁrst
investor. These two constraints are not independent: The intensity of the race to be the
ﬁrst investor is a direct consequence of the intensity of the follower preemption race between
the second and the third investors. Hence, the LPC is directly aﬀected by the FPC.
To capture this relationship between the two constraints, notice that the more intense
the follower preemption race is, the earlier t2 is, hence the tighter the constraint on t1
16Observe that in the two-player game in Section 3.1 this constraint is absent: After the ﬁrst investment,
there is a single follower left, whose investment time is not determined by a preemption race but by a
single-agent decision problem.
12imposed by the FPC becomes. At the same time, the earlier t2 is, the shorter the period
for which the ﬁrst investor earns monopoly proﬁts becomes: Early t2 makes the role of the
ﬁrst investor less desirable. Therefore, the more intense the follower preemption race is, the
less intense is the race to be the ﬁrst investor: the stronger the FPC, the weaker the LPC.
The key observation of our analysis is that for any given set of parameters, only one
of the two constraints is binding, and which constraint is binding is equivalent to whether
the ﬁrst two investments are clustered or not. If the follower preemption race is suﬃciently
intense, only the FPC is binding, and investments are clustered. Otherwise, only the LPC is
binding, and investment times are diﬀerent. We discuss these two cases below, and illustrate
them in Figure 2.
First, observe that the leader payoﬀ L1 (t) is strictly quasiconcave, and maximized at
T∗
1. By construction, it intersects F1(t) in t2. Which constraint is binding depends on the
relative position of t2 with respect to T∗
1. The intuition for this is that T∗
1, being determined
by π(1), reﬂects the desirability of the role of the ﬁrst investor, hence the strength of the
LPC, while t2 reﬂects the strength of the FPC.
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Figure 2: Clustering vs. No Clustering. In all three panels, the third investment occurs at T∗
3
and the second at the ﬁrst intersection of L2(t) and F2(t). Duopoly proﬁts decrease from panel
2(a) to 2(c), delaying the second investment time t2. In panels (2a) and (2b), t2≤ T∗
1, so in the
race to be ﬁrst, F1(t) exceeds L1(t) before t2. Hence, only the FPC is binding and investments are
clustered. Panel (2b) represents the cut-oﬀ case with t2= T∗
1. In (2c), t2> T∗
1. Therefore, L1(t)
exceeds F1(t) before t2 and the LPC alone is binding. The cost function is as in Figure 1. Flow
proﬁts π are (440,300,150) for (2a), (440,280.2,150) for (2b), (440,240,150) for (2c).
Case (i): t2 ≤ T∗
1 (Figures 2a and 2b).
The LPC is not binding, because the follower payoﬀ F1(t) exceeds the leader payoﬀ L1(t)
at any t < t2. The ﬁrst investment occurs exactly at t2: the FPC is binding. The payoﬀs
of all players are equalized. The ﬁrst two investment times are clustered: t1 = t2.
13Case (ii): t2> T∗
1 (Figure 2c).
The LPC is binding: The leader payoﬀ L1 (t) exceeds the follower payoﬀ F1(t) to the left of
t2. The preemption race to be the ﬁrst investor brings t1 forward to the earliest intersection
of leader and follower payoﬀs. The payoﬀs of all players are equalized. The FPC instead,
is not binding. The ﬁrst two investments are not clustered: t1 < T∗
1 < t2.
How model primitives determine the presence of a cluster
As can be seen in Figure 2, whether case (i) or case (ii) will occur is equivalent to whether
L2(t)−F2(t), the incentive to preempt in the 2-player subgame that follows the ﬁrst invest-
ment, is positive or negative when evaluated at T∗
1.
In the cut-oﬀ case of Figure (2b), the preemption incentive evaluated at T∗
1 is zero:
the ﬁrst intersection of L2(t) and F2(t), that identiﬁes t2, coincides exactly with T∗
1. The
follower preemption race is just intense enough to make the FPC binding and the LPC not
binding. If instead the ﬁrst intersection of L2(t) and F2(t) occurs to the left of T∗
1, as in
Figure (2a), then the preemption incentive L2(t)−F2(t) evaluated at T∗
1 is strictly positive.
Conversely, if it occurs to the right of T∗
1, as in Figure (2c), then L2(t)−F2(t) evaluated at
T∗
1 is strictly negative.
The previous observation allows us to identify the parameter range for which case (i)
and case (ii) occur, respectively. Evaluating the preemption incentive L2(t) − F2(t) at T∗
1:
L2(T∗
1) − F2(T∗
1) = π(2)
￿ T∗
3
T∗
1
e−rsds + π(3)
￿ ∞
T∗
3
e−rsds − c(T∗
1) −
￿
π(3)
￿ ∞
T∗
3
e−rsds − c(T∗
3)
￿
=
π(2)
r
￿
e−rT∗
1 − e−rT∗
3
￿
− [c(T∗
1) − c(T∗
3)] (10)
Recalling that T∗
1 is a decreasing function of π (1) and T∗
3 is a decreasing function of π (3),
we observe that the preemption incentive evaluated at T∗
1 is a function of the three proﬁt
parameters π(1), π(2), π (3). For proﬁt structures such that the preemption incentive
(10) is nonnegative, the ﬁrst two investments are clustered, for all other proﬁt structures,
clustering does not occur.
The preemption incentive (10) is monotone in each of the proﬁt parameters π(1), π(2)
and π(3). The intuition is captured by looking at how each of them aﬀects the relative
strength of the two constraints. First, the preemption incentive (10) is decreasing in π (1).
Hence, starting from the cut-oﬀ case, increasing π(1) we fall into case (ii) (no cluster-
ing). The intuition is that an increase in π(1) makes the role of leader of the three-player
14preemption race more attractive. Hence, the LPC becomes binding.
Next, consider π (2) and π(3). The preemption incentive (10) is increasing in π(2) and
decreasing in π(3). Hence, starting from the cut-oﬀ case, increasing π(2) or decreasing
π(3) there continues to be a cluster. The intuition is that an increase in π(2) or a decrease
in π(3) makes the role of the second investor more attractive relative to the role of third
investor. The preemption race among the followers becomes more intense, and this brings
t2 forward. The FPC constraint becomes stronger. At the same time, earlier t2 makes the
role of the ﬁrst investor less attractive so the LPC becomes weaker.
In Section 3.4, we will show that the intuition above can be translated into a suﬃcient
condition for the presence of a cluster: given any pair (π(1),π(3)), if π(2) is suﬃciently
close to π(1), then the ﬁrst and second investments are clustered.
3.3 The general case: N ﬁrms
In this section, we formalize and generalize our characterization of the equilibrium outcome
of the game with three players to the general case of N players.
After the ﬁrst j − 1 investments have taken place, two constraints determine the next
investment time tj. First, the LPC: preempting the leader of the current subgame, i.e. the
j-th investor, by investing earlier than tj, must not be proﬁtable. Second, the FPC: tj must
be weakly earlier than the time of the next investment, tj+1, which is determined by the
preemption race in the subgame played by the followers after the j-th investment.17
Proposition 1 below establishes that the equilibrium outcome of the game is unique,
that the rent equalization result is preserved even for a general number of players, and
allows us to construct a simple recursive algorithm to compute the equilibrium investment
times and determine the presence of clusters.
Proposition 1 The game admits a unique pure-strategy SPNE outcome, up to a permuta-
tion of players. The equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) All players receive the same payoﬀ.
(ii) The j-th and the (j + 1)-th investments are clustered if and only if the (j + 1)-th
investment time tj+1 is weakly earlier than the j-th stand-alone investment time T∗
j .
In equilibrium, all players earn a payoﬀ equal to the last investor’s:
π(N)
r e−rT∗
N −c(T∗
N).
17The above discussion holds for j ≤ N − 2. In equilibrium, the last two investment times are the
equilibrium outcome of a subgame that resembles the two-ﬁrm game illustrated in Section 3.1.
15The Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) rent-equalization result extends to the N-player game
because we assume that pre-investment payoﬀs are constant. This in turn implies that
in each preemption race the Follower payoﬀ is independent of the exact time of earlier
investments. While the game admits a unique equilibrium outcome in terms of investment
times and equilibrium payoﬀs, the role taken by each investor in the investment sequence
is not uniquely identiﬁed.18
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 suggest the following simple recursive algorithm to compute
the equilibrium investment times (t1,t2...,tN) and determine the presence of clusters:
1. The last investment time is equal to the last stand-alone investment time: tN = T∗
N,
2. For j < N,
(i) if tj+1 ≤ T∗
j , then there is a cluster: tj = tj+1.
(ii) If tj+1 > T∗
j , then tj < tj+1, and tj solves the rent equalization condition:
Lj (t) − Fj (t) = π(j)
￿ tj+1
tj
e−rsds − c(tj) + c(tj+1) = 0
where Lj (t) and Fj (t) are deﬁned analogously to L1 (t) and F1 (t).19
Case 2(i) is analogous to Case (i) in Section 3.2: the FPC alone is binding. Case 2(ii)
is analogous to Case (ii) in Section 3.2: the LPC alone is binding.
Proposition 1 has two implications that go beyond the features of the three-player
example. First, for N > 3 clusters can include more than two simultaneous investments:
suppose that the preemption race for the role of (j + 1)-th investor is suﬃciently intense
that not only tj+1 < T∗
j , but tj+1 < T∗
j−1 < T∗
j : in this case, the (j − 1)-th, j-th and
(j + 1)-th investments will be clustered. In Section 3.4 we illustrate how model primitives
aﬀect the size of a cluster.
Second, clusters can occur not only at the beginning, but at any point of the investment
18In a symmetric equilibrium all ﬁrms that have not invested yet try to invest at every equilibrium
investment time. The realized order of investments is determined by the randomization device. In an
asymmetric equilibrium the order of investments can be pre-determined or partially random. For instance,
the randomization device can be used to determine only the ﬁrst investor. Firms could then coordinate on
the identity of later investors based on this outcome. We thank a referee for pointing this out.
19For a formal deﬁnition, see proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
16sequence, except for the last. 20
3.4 The condition for a cluster
In Section 3.2 we have illustrated the mechanism that leads to clustered investments in the
special case of N = 3. We introduced the LPC and the FPC and provided an intuitive
discussion of how the model parameters aﬀect these two constraints and determine the
presence or absence of a cluster. In this section, we formally investigate how the mechanism
illustrated in Section 3.2 relates to the model primitives. More precisely, we ask under
which condition on the parameters of the model two or more subsequent investments, at
any point in the investment sequence, are clustered.
The answer is that they are clustered if the associated ﬂow proﬁts are suﬃciently close.
To obtain this result, we ﬁrst argue that whether two subsequent investments are clustered or
not depends only on a subvector of the proﬁt structure π. Second, we present a comparative
statics result relating investment times and ﬂow proﬁts. Third, we identify a suﬃcient
condition on the proﬁt structure for a cluster of two or more investments. Figure 3 illustrates
the analysis.
We start by observing that the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 1 implies the
following:
Remark 1 The condition for a cluster of two subsequent investments is independent of the
ﬂow-proﬁt parameters associated with earlier investments.
Proposition 1 states that whether the j-th and (j + 1)-th investments are clustered is
determined by the comparison of the stand-alone investment time T∗
j and the (j + 1)-th
equilibrium investment time tj+1. Hence, the condition for a cluster depends only on the
ﬂow-proﬁt parameters aﬀecting T∗
j and tj+1. As illustrated in section 2.3, T∗
j depends only
on the ﬂow-proﬁt parameter π(j). To see which proﬁt parameters determine tj+1, consider
the algorithm identifying the equilibrium investment times. The last investment occurs
at tN = T∗
N, hence it depends only on one ﬂow-proﬁt parameter, π (N). The previous
20If investment is not proﬁtable for all players, so that entry is eﬀectively endogenous, then a cluster can
also occur at the end of the investment sequence. Suppose we relax Assumption 3(ii) so that only M < N
can proﬁtably invest. After the (M − 1)-th investment, there is a race among the remaining active players
to secure the last proﬁtable investment possibility. By rent equalization, the last investor (as well as all the
predecessors) must earn the same equilibrium payoﬀ as the (N − M) players who do not invest, which is
zero. The last investment is thus brought forward to a time tM earlier than the stand-alone time T
∗
M. If
tM < T
∗
M−1, then there is cluster at tM−1 = tM. In the baseline model instead, the last investment time tN
is T
∗
N, therefore it is always strictly later than T
∗
N−1.
17investment time, tN−1, depends on π(N − 1) and on the ﬂow-proﬁt parameters that aﬀect
tN, that is on π(N). Continuing to apply the algorithm, it follows that tj+1 depends only
on π(j + 1) and on the ﬂow proﬁt parameters that aﬀect later investments, that is on the
vector (π(j + 1),π(j + 2),...,π(N)).
We now present a comparative statics result that will play a key role in the construction
of the suﬃcient condition for a cluster:
Proposition 2 Each equilibrium investment time is decreasing in the associated ﬂow proﬁt.
For expositional purposes consider a proﬁt structure such that the equilibrium invest-
ment times tj and tj+1 are diﬀerent. An increase in π(j) makes the role of the j-th investor
more proﬁtable. Rent equalization requires that the j-th investor receives the same equi-
librium payoﬀ as the (j + 1)-th investor. The latter is unaﬀected by the increase in π(j).
Hence, in equilibrium an increase in π(j) has to be oﬀset by an increase in the investment
cost. This implies bringing tj forward, because the investment cost is decreasing in time.
The monotonicity of equilibrium investment times in ﬂow proﬁts leads to our main
result. An increase in π (j) brings tj forward. For suﬃciently large π(j), that is for π (j)
suﬃciently close to π(j − 1), tj occurs at a time earlier than T∗
j−1: This results in a cluster
of the j-th and (j − 1)-th investment. By the same mechanism, if π (j) is suﬃciently close
to π(j − 2), the investment time tj is brought forward to a time even earlier than T∗
j−2.
This results in a cluster of three investments: tj−2 = tj−1 = tj. Figure 3 illustrates this
mechanism. More generally, for any j ∈ {2,..,N − 1} and k ∈ {1,..,j − 1}, the suﬃcient
condition for a cluster of two or more investments is as follows:
Proposition 3 If π (j) is suﬃciently close to π (j − k), then the j-th investment is clustered
with the previous k investments.
To capture the intuition for this result, consider the simplest case of a cluster of two
investments. Suppose that the parameter values are such that the j-th investment is not
clustered with the previous one. Consider an increase in the ﬂow proﬁts π (j). How does it
aﬀect the preemption incentives in the game? The same reasoning illustrated in Section 3.2
and Figure 2 for N = 3 and j = 2 applies here. The (j − 1)-th investment time is determined
by the Follower and Leader Preemption Constraints (FPC and LPC). Everything else equal,
an increase in π(j) makes the role of the j-th investor more attractive. Therefore, the
follower preemption race in the subgame starting after the (j − 1)-th investment becomes
18more intense. This brings forward the investment time tj, which constitutes the upper
bound on the investment time tj−1 stemming from the FPC. In turn, an earlier investment
time tj makes the role of the (j − 1)-th investor less attractive, so the preemption race
for the role of the (j − 1)-th investor is less intense, and the LPC becomes weaker. The
natural question is whether one can increase π(j) to such an extent that the FPC becomes
binding and the LPC not binding. Proposition 3 provides a positive answer: for any value
of the remaining primitives of the model, one can always ﬁnd a π(j) strictly smaller than
π(j − 1) but suﬃciently close to it, such that the FPC is binding, the LPC is not, and the
j-th investment is clustered with the previous one.
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Figure 3: The Size of a Cluster. In all three panels, N = 5, the cost function isc(t) = 2 · 10
4e−(α+r)t
with α = 0.4 and r = 0.1 and ﬂow proﬁts (π(1),π(2),π(4),π(5)) are (340,320,280,270). Tri-
opoly proﬁts π(3) increase from 300 in (3a) to 308 in (3b) and to 316 in (3c). The investment
times t4 and t5 are unaﬀected by this increase (Remark 1). Also, T∗
1 and T∗
2 are the same in all
panels. In (2a), T∗
1< T∗
2< t3 and no cluster occurs. In (2b) and (2c), the larger π(3) brings the
third investment time t3 forward (Proposition 2). In (2b), π(3) is suﬃciently close to π(2) such
that T∗
1< t3< T∗
2 and the second and third investments are clustered. In (2c) a further increase of
π(3) makes it suﬃciently close to π(1), such that t3< T∗
1< T∗
2 and the ﬁrst three investments are
clustered (Proposition 3).
We conclude with a remark regarding what can be learned about proﬁts, when data on
the timing of investments are observed. Our result says that clustering of entry or adoption
times does not imply that payoﬀs are not declining in rival investment. If investment times
are generated by a preemption game and clustering is observed, this implies a bound on
the decline in proﬁts due to rival investment. In the case where only time aggregated
information is available, for instance in the form of annual data, bounds could nevertheless
19be obtained but would be less informative the higher the level of temporal aggregation.
Consider the case N = 3 and ﬁx the investment cost function and the interest rate.
Then one can ﬁnd π(3) as it is the unique solution to the stand-alone problem in (2) given
T∗
3. Knowing T∗
3 and π(3), one can ﬁnd π(2) by plugging the observed t2 into the rent-
equalization condition L2(t2) = F2(t2). If t1 < t2, one can repeat the same procedure and
use L1(t1) = F1(t1) to ﬁnd π(1). If instead t1 = t2, i.e. there is a cluster, one can infer that
π(1) must be small enough, such that T∗
1 > t2. Thus, an upper bound ¯ π(1) for π(1) as a
function of t2 can be obtained This implies that π(1) must lie in the interval [π(2), ¯ π(1)].
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzed an N-player preemption game in which players’ payoﬀ before investing
are constant (and normalized to zero). The game has a unique equilibrium outcome, and
the rent equalization result of the two-player game analyzed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
is preserved.
We ﬁnd that clusters of simultaneous investments are possible. When the preemption
race among late investors is very intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors is
reduced. If this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong, two or more investments occur at the same time.
We characterize a suﬃcient condition on the model primitives for two or more investments
to be clustered: The ﬂow proﬁts of subsequent investments must be suﬃciently close. Our
results imply that the observation of investment clustering in preemptive environments need
not reﬂect informational spillovers, positive externalities, or coordination failures. Instead,
clustering implies a bound on the decline in proﬁts due to rival investment.
Appendix
Claim 1 For any j ∈ {1,2...,N}: (a) the function fj (t) is strictly quasi-concave in t.
(b) It admits a unique global maximum in T∗
j , deﬁned as the solution to
f￿
j (t) = 0 ⇐⇒ −π(j)e−rt − c￿ (t) = 0.
(c) fj
￿
T∗
j
￿
> 0 and T∗
j < T∗
j￿ for j < j￿.
Proof of Claim 1. Part (a) We prove that the function is strictly quasiconcave, by
20showing that in every critical point of the function the second derivative is strictly negative.
The ﬁrst derivative f￿
j (t) is equal to
￿
−π(j)e−rt − c￿ (t)
￿
and the second derivative f￿￿
j (t)
is equal to
￿
rπ(j)e−rt − c￿￿ (t)
￿
. Using f￿
j (t) = 0 we can rewrite f￿￿
j evaluated at any critical
point as
f￿￿
j (t) = −c￿ (t)r − c￿￿ (t). (11)
By Assumption 2, ert [c￿ (t) + rc(t)] < 0 and ert￿
2c￿ (t)r + c(t)r2 + c￿￿ (t)
￿
> 0. Together,
these two inequalities imply that expression (11) is negative.
Part (b) We prove that the ﬁrst order condition f￿
j (t) = 0 admits a solution and hence
characterizes the unique global maximum of the function by showing that f￿
j (t) is positive at
zero and negative for suﬃciently large values of t. Assumptions 1 and 3 guarantee that fj (t)
is negative at zero and positive at a later time. Quasiconcavity then implies that f￿
j (0) > 0.
Moreover, since fj (t) is continuous and either always increasing or single peaked, it admits
a limit as t goes to inﬁnity. This limit must be greater than or equal to zero by assumption
3(ii). It must also be smaller than or equal to zero because limt→+∞ fj (t) = −limt→+∞ c(t).
Hence, the only possible candidate limit is zero. But if that is the case, since the function
is positive from some τ onwards, as t goes to inﬁnity it must approach zero from above.
Hence it must be decreasing for t suﬃciently large. We therefore conclude that the function
fj (t) admits a critical point.
Part (c) Assumptions 2(i) and 3(ii) imply that fN(t) is strictly positive for any t ≥ T∗
N.
Thus, Assumption 1(ii) implies that fj
￿
T∗
j
￿
> 0 for all j.
Finally, note that by the implicit function theorem
∂T∗
j
∂π(j)
= −
−e
−rT∗
j
f￿￿
j
￿
T∗
j
￿ < 0,
where the inequality holds because T∗
j is a maximum, hence the denominator is negative.
Therefore, Assumption 1(ii) implies that T∗
1 < T∗
2 < ... < T∗
N .￿
Proof of Lemma 1. Assumptions 1(ii) and 3(i) guarantee that there is no investment at
time zero: the cost of investing immediately is higher than the maximum amount of proﬁts
a ﬁrm can obtain in this game.
The proof of the result that all ﬁrms invest in ﬁnite time, and the last investment takes
place at the stand-alone investment time T∗
N is split into two parts. First, we show that in
equilibrium, at any decision node with one active ﬁrm and calendar time t, the ﬁrm plays
21“wait” if t < T∗
N and “invest” otherwise. Then, we show that in any decision node with
t ≥ T∗
N any number of active ﬁrms play “invest”.
The payoﬀ of a single active ﬁrm from investing at time t is fN(t), deﬁned in equation
(2). From Claim 1, fN(t) has a strict global maximum in T∗
N and its maximum value is
strictly positive. Therefore, a single active ﬁrm will optimally play “wait” if t < T∗
N and
“invest” otherwise.
Next, consider decision nodes with t ≥ T∗
N and two active ﬁrms. We show that both
ﬁrms must invest exactly at t.
First, suppose that at t they both play “invest”. By assumption 4 only one of them
succeeds and the game enters a subgame with one active ﬁrm. As we proved above, this ﬁrm
invests immediately, so both ﬁrms invest at time t and receive payoﬀ fN(t). No ﬁrm has
an incentive to deviate from these strategies. With two active ﬁrms, deviating and playing
“wait” would not change the outcome, nor the deviator’s payoﬀ. The non-deviating ﬁrm
would invest immediately. The game would therefore enter a subgame with one active ﬁrm
in which the deviator would optimally invest immediately, as we proved above.
Next, suppose that at time t only one of the two active ﬁrms plays “invest”. The
outcome is again that both ﬁrms invest at t, because after one ﬁrm invests the game enters
a subgame with one active ﬁrm in which it is optimal to invest immediately. No ﬁrm has
an incentive to deviate from these strategies. The ﬁrm who plays “wait” has no incentive
to deviate because the outcome, hence its payoﬀ, would be unchanged. Now suppose that
the ﬁrm who plays “invest” deviates. It would get either a payoﬀ of zero, if it never invests,
or fN(τ) if it invests at some τ > t. Since fN(·) is positive and strictly decreasing in the
interval considered, the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Finally, suppose that at time t both ﬁrms play “wait”. The argument immediately
above shows that each ﬁrm would be better oﬀ by deviating and playing “invest” at t.
Repeating the same argument for ￿ = 3,...,N, it follows that in any SPNE, at any
decision node with t ≥ T∗
N and any number ￿ of active ﬁrms, at least one of them plays
“invest”, and the claim follows immediately. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Through a series of Lemmata we show that the game admits
a unique SPNE outcome, and characterize its properties. The proof is articulated in the
following steps:
Denote by tj the SPNE investment time of the j-th investor, for j ∈ {1,..,N}. In
22Deﬁnition 1, we introduce three functions, Lj(t), Fj(t), and their diﬀerence Dj (t). In
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we characterize their properties. Over a well-deﬁned subset of their
domain, Lj(t) and Fj(t) can be interpreted as the payoﬀ of the j-th investor and the (j + 1)-
th investor, respectively, if the j-th investment takes place at t and the following investments
take place at tj+1,..., tN respectively. In the deﬁnition, the existence and uniqueness of the
SPNE investment times is assumed. In the development of the proof, they will be proved.
The existence and uniqueness of tN = T∗
N was proved in Lemma 1.
In Lemma 4 we establish that in any subgame with one active ﬁrm, it plays “wait” before
T∗
N and “invest” from T∗
N on. In Lemma 5, we prove that there exists a time TN−1 < T∗
N
in which LN−1(TN−1) = FN−1(TN−1) and in Lemma 6 we prove that this is the unique
(N − 1)-th equilibrium investment time. Therefore, the equilibrium payoﬀ of the last two
investors is the same.
Finally, in Lemmata 7, 8 and 9 we identify the algorithm for the construction of the
equilibrium investment times tj for j ∈ {1,...,N−2}, identifying the condition for clustering,
and prove that rent equalization holds in equilibrium for all players. The argument is based
on the induction principle. Lemma 7 proves that there exists an algorithm to identify the
unique tN−2, given tN−1 and tN, and that the equilibrium payoﬀ of the last three investors
is the same. Lemma 8 shows that if an analogous algorithm can be used to identify a unique
value of tN−l, given tN−l+1,...,tN, and rent equalization holds for the last l players, then the
same algorithm identiﬁes a unique value for tN−l−1, given tN−l,...,tN, and rent equalization
holds for the last l + 1 players. Lemma 9 applies the induction principle to prove that
the algorithm can be used to construct the SPNE investment times t1,..., tN−2 and rent
equalization holds for all players. This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
Deﬁnition 1 For each j ∈ {1,..,N − 1}, we deﬁne the following three functions over the
interval [0,T∗
N]:
Lj(t) ≡ π(j)
￿ tj+1
t
e−rsds +
N ￿
m=j+1
π(m)
￿ tm+1
tm
e−rsds − c(t)
Fj(t) ≡
N ￿
m=j+1
π(m)
￿ tm+1
tm
e−rsds − c(tj+1)
Dj (t) ≡ Lj(t) − Fj(t) = π(j)
￿ tj+1
t
e−rsds − c(t) + c(tj+1)
where tN+1 ≡ +∞.
23Notice that Fj(t) is constant with respect to t.
Lemma 2
(i) The function Dj (t) attains a unique global maximum in T∗
j , for j ∈ {1,..,N − 1}
(ii) Dj(T∗
j ) ≥ 0 for j ∈ {1,..,N − 1}.
Proof.
Part (i). Notice that
Dj (t) = π(j)
￿ tj+1
t
e−rsds − c(t) + c(tj+1) (12)
and fj(t) as deﬁned in equation (2) diﬀer by a ﬁnite constant. By Claim 1, fj(t) attains a
unique global maximum in T∗
j , hence the same is true for Dj (t).
Part (ii). Since Dj (tj+1) = 0 and T∗
j is the unique global maximizer, it holds that
Dj(T∗
j ) ≥ 0. ￿
Lemma 3
(i) If T∗
j ≤ tj+1, then ∃Tj ∈ (0,T∗
j ], such that Dj(Tj) = 0,
(ii) If T∗
j > tj+1, then Dj(t) < 0 and D￿
j(t) > 0 ∀t < tj+1.
Proof. Since Dj(t) and fj(t) diﬀer by a ﬁnite constant, Claim 1 implies that Dj(t) is
strictly quasi-concave. Also, Dj (0) < 0, since
Lj(0) = π(j)
￿ tj+1
0
e−rsds +
N ￿
m=j+1
π(m)
￿ tm+1
tm
e−rsds − c(0)
<
π(1)
r
− c(0)
< 0
≤ V j+1(t1,...tN)
=
N ￿
m=j+1
π(m)
￿ tm+1
tm
e−rsds − c(tj+1)
= Fj(0)
Here the second inequality holds by assumption 3(i) and the third because no ﬁrm gets a
negative payoﬀ in equilibrium as it could always delay investment indeﬁnitely ensuring a
payoﬀ of zero. Moreover, Dj (tj+1) = 0. Therefore, two cases are possible:
(i): T∗
j ≤ tj+1, in which case ∃Tj ∈ (0,T∗
j ], such that Dj(Tj) = 0, and Dj(t) > 0 in the
24interval t ∈ (Tj,tj+1),
(ii) T∗
j > tj+1, in which case Dj(t) < 0 and D￿
j(t) > 0 ∀t < tj+1. ￿
In the next Lemma, we analyze decision nodes with one active ﬁrm.
Lemma 4 In equilibrium, if at time t there is one active ﬁrm, it plays “wait” if t < T∗
N
and “invest” if t ≥ T∗
N.
Proof. The result follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 1. ￿
In the next Lemma, we show that for the case j = N − 1, case (i) of Lemma 3 applies.
Lemma 5 T∗
N−1 < tN = T∗
N and ∃TN−1 < T∗
N−1 < T∗
N such that DN−1 (TN−1) = 0.
Proof. T∗
N−1 < T∗
N by Claim 1 and tN = T∗
N by Lemma 1. The rest of the statement
follows from Lemma 3. ￿
In the next Lemma we show that the (N − 1)-th equilibrium investment time is TN−1.
Lemma 6 In equilibrium, it holds that:
(i) In all subgames starting at t ∈ [TN−1,T∗
N), if there are n > 1 active ﬁrms, n − 1
investments take place at t.
(ii) In all subgames starting at t ∈ [0,TN−1), if there are n = 2 active ﬁrms, each of them
plays “wait”.
(iii) tN−1 = TN−1 and the equilibrium payoﬀ of the last two investors is the same.
Proof.
Part (i) We start from the observation that if t belongs to the interval (TN−1,T∗
N), then
DN−1(t) > 0, while if t = TN−1, then DN−1(t) = 0. The proof now consists of three steps:
Step (a) identiﬁes two strategy proﬁles that generate the same outcome and constitute an
equilibrium for any subgame with n > 1 active ﬁrms starting at t ∈ (TN−1,T∗
N). Step (b)
rules out any other candidate equilibrium for subgames with n > 1 active ﬁrms starting at
t ∈ (TN−1,T∗
N). Step (c) considers subgames with n > 1 active ﬁrms starting exactly at
t = TN−1.
(a) We ﬁrst show that it is an equilibrium for any subgame with n > 1 active ﬁrms
starting at t ∈ (TN−1,T∗
N) that each active ﬁrm plays “invest” at all times τ ≥ t, unless it
is the only active ﬁrm.21 The outcome of this candidate equilibrium is that all active ﬁrms
21The proof that the above proﬁle is an equilibrium also proves that the following strategy proﬁle, which
generates the same outcome, is an equilibrium: In all subgames with n > 1 active ﬁrms starting at t ∈
(TN−1,T
∗
N) each active ﬁrm plays “wait” at t and “invest” at all times τ > t, unless it is the only active
one.
25try to invest immediately at t, until only one is left. The last active ﬁrm will then wait to
invest until time T∗
N by Lemma 4. The associated payoﬀ for each ﬁrm is a lottery between
LN−1 (t) and FN−1 (t) with probability 1
n assigned to FN−1 (t).
Suppose one ﬁrm deviates and plays “wait” at t although it is not the only active ﬁrm.
We show that any deviation involving the play of “wait” at t when one or more other ﬁrms
are active gives a smaller payoﬀ than the payoﬀ in the candidate equilibrium. We need to
distinguish three possible classes of deviations according to the speciﬁc circumstances when
the deviator plays “wait”.
First, consider the class of deviations in which the ﬁrm plays “wait” at t if at least one
other ﬁrm is active. At t, the n − 1 non-deviating ﬁrms follow the given strategies, hence
n− 1 investments occur at t and the deviating ﬁrm becomes the last active one. By Claim
1, the most proﬁtable deviation in this class is the one in which the deviator later invests at
T∗
N. The associated payoﬀ is FN−1 (t) which is smaller than the lottery between LN−1 (t)
and FN−1 (t) given by the candidate equilibrium.
Second, consider the class of deviations in which the ﬁrm plays “wait” at t if the number
of active ﬁrms is diﬀerent from n−l, for a given l such that n−l > 1. At t, the n−1 non-
deviating ﬁrms follow the given strategies. The deviation outcome is the following. First,
the n− 1 non-deviating ﬁrms will play “invest” until l investments will occur. Then, when
there are n−l active ﬁrms left, all of them, including the deviator, will play “invest”. With
probability 1
n−l, the deviating ﬁrm will successfully invest and receive payoﬀ LN−1 (t). With
the complementary probability, the deviating ﬁrm will fail to invest. In the latter case, the
game enters a subgame with n−l−1 active ﬁrms in which all ﬁrms except for the deviator
will continue to play “invest” at t, until the deviator is the only active ﬁrm. By Claim 1,
we can again identify the most proﬁtable deviation within this class: If the outcome of the
randomization device is such that the deviator is unsuccessful in investing when there are
n−l active ﬁrms, the deviator will be the last active ﬁrm remaining. In this case, it should
then invest at T∗
N. Hence, the highest payoﬀ in this class of deviations is a lottery between
LN−1 (t) and FN−1 (t), with probability n−l−1
n−l assigned to FN−1 (t), which is worse than
the lottery deriving from the candidate equilibrium strategies because n−l−1
n−l > 1
n.
Third, an analogous argument shows that the class of deviations in which the ﬁrm plays
“wait” at t if the number of active ﬁrms is diﬀerent from n−l, for a set of at least two integers
l, such that n − l > 1 for every l, the highest possible payoﬀ is a lottery between LN−1 (t)
and FN−1 (t), which assigns to FN−1 (t) a higher probability than the lottery deriving from
26the candidate equilibrium strategies.
(b) Next, we show that if t belongs to the interval (TN−1,T∗
N), no strategy proﬁle diﬀerent
from the ones presented in (a) constitutes an equilibrium. We need to rule out two classes
of strategy proﬁles: one in which at t, with n active ﬁrms, one or more ﬁrm plays “wait”
and one or more ﬁrms play “invest”, and one in which all active ﬁrms play “wait” in an
interval with positive measure starting at t.
We develop the argument by induction. First we show it holds for n = 2 active ﬁrms.
Then we show that if it holds for n = m ≥ 2, then it holds for n = m + 1. Finally, we
conclude that it holds for any n ≥ 2 by the induction principle.
The statement holds for n = 2. We consider two classes of strategy proﬁles: one in
which at t, with two active ﬁrms, one ﬁrm plays “wait” and the other plays “invest”, and
one in which both active ﬁrms play “wait” in an interval with positive measure starting at
t.
No strategy proﬁle in the ﬁrst class can be an equilibrium, because the ﬁrm who plays
“wait” ends up being the last active ﬁrm in the game, thus receiving a payoﬀ no larger
than FN−1 (t), while it could proﬁtably deviate by playing “invest” and receiving a lottery
between LN−1 (t) and FN−1 (t).
Strategy proﬁles in the second class imply that the ﬁrst investment in the subgame
occurs strictly later than t and weakly before T∗
N (by Lemma 1), at some τ ∈ (t,T∗
N], and
the second at T∗
N by Lemma 4. The strategy proﬁles for which both ﬁrms play “invest” at
τ cannot be an equilibrium because both ﬁrms get 1
2 [LN−1 (τ) + FN−1 (τ)] while each of
them could deviate by investing at τ −ε and receiving LN−1 (τ − ε). By continuity, ∃ε > 0
small enough that this is proﬁtable. The strategies proﬁles for which only one of the two
ﬁrms plays “invest” at τ cannot be an equilibrium. The ﬁrm who does not invest at τ must
invest at T∗
N by Lemma 4, thus receiving FN−1 (τ). It could proﬁtably deviate by investing
at τ − ε and getting LN−1 (τ − ε).
If the statement holds for m, it holds for m+1. Again, we need to consider two classes
of strategy proﬁles: one in which at time t, with m + 1 active ﬁrms, only ν < m + 1 play
“invest”, with ν > 0, and one in which all active ﬁrms play “wait” in an interval with
positive measure starting at t.
No strategy proﬁle in the ﬁrst class can be an equilibrium. At t, one of the ν ﬁrms will
succesfully invest and the game will enter a subgame with m active ﬁrms and calendar time
t. Given the assumption that the statement holds for n = m, in such a subgame all m active
27ﬁrms invest immediately until only one is left, which invests at T∗
N. Hence, each of them
receives payoﬀ LN−1 (t) with probability m−1
m and payoﬀ FN−1 (t) with probability 1
m. This
implies that any of the m+1−ν ﬁrms who play “wait” at t when there are still m+1 active
ﬁrms receives expected payoﬀ 1
m [(m − 1)LN−1 (t) + FN−1 (t)]. It could proﬁtably deviate
by playing “invest” at t with m + 1 active ﬁrms. This deviation is proﬁtable because it
increases the probability of receiving LN−1 (t) and decreases the probability of receiving
FN−1 (t).
Strategy proﬁles in the second class imply that the ﬁrst investment in the subgame
occurs strictly later than t and weakly before T∗
N (by Lemma 1), at some τ ∈ (t,T∗
N].
Consider any such proﬁle and denote by ν = 1,...,m + 1 the number of ﬁrms who play
“invest” at time τ if there are m+1 active ﬁrms. At τ, one succesful investment occurs and
the game enters a subgame with m active ﬁrms. Given the assumption that the statement
holds for n = m, at τ all the m remaining active ﬁrms invest immediately until only one is
left, who invests at T∗
N. For ν < m + 1, there is at least one ﬁrm who initally plays “wait”
at τ. This ﬁrm receives 1
m [(m − 1)LN−1 (τ) + FN−1 (τ)]. It could proﬁtably deviate by
investing at τ − ε and receiving LN−1 (τ − ε) which is a larger payoﬀ, for ε small enough.
If instead ν = m + 1, all ﬁrms receive payoﬀ 1
m+1 [mLN−1 (τ) + FN−1 (τ)]. Each of them
could proﬁtably deviate by preempting the opponents and investing at τ − ε. This would
yield payoﬀ LN−1 (τ − ε) which is larger than the above, for ε small enough.
This completes the induction argument and we can conclude that if t belongs to the
interval (TN−1,T∗
N), no strategy proﬁle diﬀerent from the ones presented in (a) constitutes
an equilibrium.
(c) We conclude by considering subgames with n > 1 active ﬁrms, starting at t = TN−1.
While DN−1(t) > 0 for t ∈ (TN−1,T∗
N), on the other hand DN−1(t) = 0 for t = TN−1. This
implies that the proof in step (a) also holds for subgames starting at t = TN−1. Hence the
proﬁles analyzed in (a) also constitute an equilibrium for the subgames with n > 1 active
ﬁrms, starting at t = TN−1. Now consider step (b). It shows that for for t ∈ (TN−1,T∗
N)
strategy proﬁles in two classes cannot be an equilibrium: proﬁles in which at t, with n
active ﬁrms, one or more ﬁrm plays “wait” and one or more ﬁrms play “invest”, and
proﬁles in which all active ﬁrms play “wait” in an interval with positive measure starting
at t. For subgames starting at t = TN−1 instead, while it is true that proﬁles in the second
class cannot be an equilibrium, strategy proﬁles in the ﬁrst class are an equilibrium. The
outcome of such a proﬁle is that n−1 investments occur at TN−1 and one occurs at T∗
N. All
28players receive payoﬀ LN−1 (TN−1) = FN−1 (TN−1). Hence, there is no proﬁtable deviation.
Part (ii). If t belongs to the interval [0,TN−1), it holds that LN−1 (t) < FN−1 (t) and
that LN−1(t) is increasing. Given part (i) of this Lemma, and Lemma 4, if ﬁrms follow the
actions prescribed in part (ii) the expected payoﬀ for each of them is
1
2
[LN−1(TN−1) + FN−1 (TN−1)] = LN−1(TN−1) = FN−1 (TN−1)
where the equality comes from the deﬁnition of TN−1. The deviation payoﬀ from investing
at some τ before TN−1 is LN−1(τ) < LN−1(TN−1), hence this is an equilibrium.
Next, we show that there is no other action proﬁle compatible with equilibrium. Suppose
that ν ≤ 2 ﬁrms play “invest” at τ. The equilibrium payoﬀ for any of these early investors
is
1
ν
[LN−1(τ) + (ν − 1)FN−1 (τ)]
Each of them could proﬁtably deviate by playing “wait” at τ, since FN−1 (τ) > LN−1 (τ).
This concludes the proof of part (ii).
Part (iii). The conclusion that tN−1 = TN−1 follows directly from parts (i) and (ii) and
from Lemma 4. By construction of TN−1, this implies rent equalization for the last two
investors. ￿
We now identify the algorithm for the construction of the equilibrium investment times
tj for j ∈ {1,...,N − 1}. The argument is based on the induction principle. Lemma 7
contains a statement for j = N − 2. Lemma 8 shows that if the same statement holds for
j = N − l, then it holds for j = N − l − 1. Lemma 9 concludes that, by the induction
principle, the statement holds for a general j.
Lemma 7 Given tN = T∗
N and tN−1 = TN−1, tN−2 can be constructed as follows.
Part (a) Suppose T∗
N−2 < TN−1. In equilibrium it holds that:
(i) In all subgames starting at t ∈ [TN−2,TN−1), if there are n > 2 active ﬁrms, n − 2
investments take place at t.
(ii)In all subgames starting at t ∈ [0,TN−2), if there are 3 active ﬁrms, each of them plays
“wait”
(iii) tN−2 = TN−2 and the payoﬀ of the last 3 investors is equalized.
Part (b) Suppose T∗
N−2 ≥ TN−1. In equilibrium it holds that:
(i) In all subgames starting at t ∈ [0,TN−1), if there are n = 3 active ﬁrms, each of them
29plays “wait”
(ii) tN−2 = TN−1 and the payoﬀ of the last 3 investors is equalized.
Proof.
Part (a): By Lemma 3 (i), ∃TN−2 ∈ (0 < T∗
N−2], such that DN−2(TN−2) = 0. The proofs
of parts (i) and (ii) follow from arguments similar to the proofs of parts (i) and (ii) of
Lemma 6, respectively.
The conclusion that tN−2 = TN−2 follows directly from parts (i) and (ii) and from
Lemmata 6 and 4. By construction of TN−2, this implies rent equalization for the last three
ﬁrms.
Part (b): By Lemma 3 (ii), LN−2 (t) < FN−2 (t) and L￿
N−2(t) > 0 ∀t < TN−1. The proof
of part (i) follows from arguments analogous to the proof of part (ii) of Lemma 6. The
conclusion that tN−2 = tN−1 = TN−1 follows directly from part (i) and from Lemmata 4
and 6. By construction of TN−1, this implies rent equalization for the last three ﬁrms. ￿
Lemma 8 If the following statement holds for j = N − l, with l ≥ 2, then it holds for
j = N − l − 1.
Given the last N −j equilibrium investment times (tj+1,...,tN), and given rent equalization
for the last (N − j) investors, the j-th equilibrium investment time tj can be constructed as
follows:
Part (a) Suppose T∗
j < tj+1. In equilibrium it holds that:
(i) In all subgames starting at t ∈ [Tj,tj+1), if there are n > N − j active ﬁrms, n− N +j
investments take place at t.
(ii) In all subgames starting at t ∈ [0,Tj), if there are n = N − j + 1 active ﬁrms, each of
them plays “wait”
(iii) tj = Tj and the payoﬀ of the last N − j + 1 investors is equalized.
Part (b) Suppose T∗
j ≥ tj+1. In equilibrium it holds that:
(i)In all subgames starting at t ∈ [0,tj+1], if there are n = N − j + 1 active ﬁrms, each of
them plays “wait”:
(ii) tj = tj+1 and the payoﬀ of the last N − j + 1 investors is equalized.
Proof. Assume that the statement holds for j = N−l. This implies that either tN−l = TN−l
or tN−l = tN−l+1, and that in both cases payoﬀs of the last l + 1 investors are equalized.
30Now we need to prove that the statement holds for j = N − l − 1.
Part (a): By Lemma 3 (i), ∃TN−l−1 ∈ (0 < T∗
N−l−1], such that DN−l−1(TN−l−1) = 0.
The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) follow from arguments similar to the proofs of parts (i) and
(ii) of Lemma 6, respectively. For part (iii), the conclusion that tN−l−1 = TN−l−1 follows
directly from parts (i) and (ii) and from the assumptions. By construction of TN−l−1, this
implies rent equalization for the last l + 2 ﬁrms.
Part (b): By Lemma 3 (ii), DN−l−1(t) < 0 and D￿
N−l−1(t) > 0 ∀t < tN−l. The proof
of part (i) follows from arguments analogous to the proof of part (ii) of Lemma 6. The
conclusion that tN−l−1 = TN−l follows directly from part (i) and from the assumptions.
By construction of TN−l, this implies rent equalization for the last l + 2 ﬁrms. ￿
Lemma 9 The statement in Lemma 8 holds for any j ≤ N − 2.
Proof. The result follows from Lemmata 7 and 8 by the induction principle. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. First, suppose that the proﬁt structure π is such that tj < tj+1.
By construction, tj solves:
π(j)
r
￿
e−rtj − e−rtj+1￿
− [c(tj) − c(tj+1)] = 0.
Diﬀerentiating implicitly yields:
∂tj
∂π(j) = −[e
−rtj−e
−rtj+1]/r
−π(j)e
−rtj−c￿(tj) . The numerator is positive,
because tj < tj+1. The denominator is positive as well, because in equilibrium tj < T∗
j+1.
Therefore, tj is decreasing in π(j). Next, suppose instead that the proﬁt structure π is such
that tj = tj+1. That is, suppose that the proﬁt structure π is such that tj+1 ≤ T∗
j . If a
marginal change in π(j) does not aﬀect the inequality tj+1 ≤ T∗
j , tj is aﬀected only by the
ﬂow proﬁt parameters that aﬀect tj+1, hence it is constant in π(j). If instead a marginal
change in π (j) changes the inequality to tj+1 > T∗
j , we fall into the previous case and tj
decreases. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that for a given proﬁt structure π, tj−k < tj. We
prove that there exists ￿ π(j) such that for the modiﬁed game with proﬁt structure ￿ π with
￿ π(l) = π(l) for all l ≤ j − k and all l > j, ￿ π(j) ∈ (￿ π(j),π(j − k)) and ￿ π(l) > ￿ π(l + 1) for
all l, investment times tj−k and tj are clustered.
For the proﬁt structure π, let z ≥ 1 be the number of investments occurring jointly
in equilibrium at the beginning of the subgame played among the last N − j + 1 players,
31so that tj = ... = tj+z−1. Suppose z = 1. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that in this
case tj strictly decreases in π(j). Moreover, limπ(j)→π(j−k) T∗
j = T∗
j−k. Since tj < T∗
j , there
exists a ￿ π(j) large enough that tj < T∗
j−k in any modiﬁed game with proﬁt structure ￿ π with
￿ π(l) = π(l) for all l ≤ j−k and all l > j, ￿ π(j) ∈ (￿ π(j),π (j − k)) and ￿ π(l) > ￿ π(l+1) for all
l. Now suppose that instead z > 1. The fact that tj−k < tj implies that T∗
j−k < tj = tj+z−1.
Since T∗
j is strictly decreasing in π(j) and limπ(j)→π(j−k) T∗
j = T∗
j−k < tj+z−1, there exists
a π (j) suﬃciently close to π(j − k) such that T∗
j < tj+1 = ... = tj+z−1, and tj < T∗
j < tj+1
in any modiﬁed game with proﬁt structure π with π(l) = π (l) for all l ≤ j−k and all l > j,
π(j) ∈ (π (j),π (j − k)), and π(l) > π(l + 1) for all l. Then, starting from the game with
proﬁt structure π the proof for the case z = 1 applies.￿
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